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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Plaintiff’s false designation of origin and false endorsement claims, such as they 
are, rest on the assertion that defendants falsely represented themselves as the origin 
of intellectual property on which the Oculus Rift is based. Those claims are barred 
by Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), which holds 
that only confusion regarding the origin of physical goods is actionable under the 
Lanham Act.   
I. ARGUMENT 
A. ZeniMax’s False Designation of Origin Claim is Barred by Dastar 
The gravamen of ZeniMax’s false designation of origin claim is difficult to 
discern but appears to rest on the allegation that “Defendants wrongfully held out 
ZeniMax’s intellectual property as their own” (ECF 968 at 4) when “the Oculus Rift 
Kickstarter video[] misleadingly attribute[d] Carmack’s work at ZeniMax to 
Oculus.” (ECF 963 at 20).1 That claim is plainly barred by Dastar v. Twentieth 
Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23 (2003), because it alleges false designation of the origin 
                                                          
1 See also Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Entry of 
Permanent Injunction (“Injunction Brief) at 1 (characterizing the jury verdict as 
having found that Defendants falsely designated “ZeniMax’s technology as its own”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 6 (suggesting that Defendants built and promoted a business 
based on ZeniMax’s technology); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for 
Judgment as a Matter of Law Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) at 1 
(claiming that Defendants stole, copied, and passed off as their own “breakthrough 
virtual reality (VR) technology” developed by ZeniMax).   
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of intangible content (intellectual property) rather than of any tangible goods, as the 
Lanham Act requires. Thus, ZeniMax’s false designation of origin claim would be 
barred even if ZeniMax were right that defendants’ presentations falsely suggested 
that defendants created the technology on which the Oculus Rift devices operate, 
because any confusion about the origin of the technology is irrelevant for Lanham 
Act purposes. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32 (“as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase “origin 
of goods” is in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated 
the ideas or communications that “goods” embody or contain”).  
Dastar copied footage from the Crusade in Europe television series originally 
released by Twentieth Century Fox and re-used that footage in its own video series 
without attributing the footage to Fox. According to Fox, that unattributed use 
constituted reverse passing off:  Dastar was passing off Fox’s content as though it 
were Dastar’s own, thereby falsely designating the origin of the video series in 
violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27.  That section makes 
actionable use of  
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval 
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.  
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  
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Because some lower courts had allowed claims in this sort of context, the 
Supreme Court was forced to consider the meaning of the phrase “origin of goods” 
in the Lanham Act. And the Court concluded that “the most natural understanding 
of ‘origin’ of ‘goods’ – the source of wares – is the producer of the tangible product 
sold in the marketplace.” Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31. The concept of origin “might be 
stretched,” the Court allowed, “to include not only the actual producer,” but the party 
who “stood behind production of the physical product.” Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32. 
“Origin of goods,” however, is “incapable of connoting the person or entity that 
originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.” Id. at 32. 
Whatever the range of relationships that might legitimately be regarded as those of 
legal “origin,” they must relate to the physical goods and not merely the intangible 
content embodied therein. 
This case is strikingly similar to General Universal Systems, Inc. v. Lee, 379 
F.3d 131 (5th Cir. 2004). In that case, General Universal Systems (GUS) sued HAL, 
two of its officers, and several of HAL’s customers (collectively “HAL”), claiming 
that HAL infringed its copyright in a freight management system, misappropriated 
trade secrets, violated the Lanham Act, and breached a contract. Id. at 137. More 
specifically, GUS alleged that the defendants made an unauthorized copy of GUS’s 
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freight tracking software and marketed that software under the defendant’s own 
mark.2  
The Fifth Circuit rejected GUS’s false designation of origin claim, noting that 
the Supreme Court had “carefully distinguished Lanham Act claims from copyright 
claims”; unlike copyright, Lanham Act claims were “not designed to protect 
originality or creativity.” Id. at 149 quoting Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. GUS’s false 
designation of origin claims were barred because GUS had not accused the 
defendants of “taking tangible copies of its software, removing its trademarks, and 
selling [the tangible copies] as its own,” but instead asserted that defendants had 
“copied the ideas, concepts, structures, and sequences embodied in” its software. Id. 
at 149. “In sum and substance, GUS’s claim [was] simply a claim that [defendants] 
ha[d] infringed its copyright” in its software. Id. As the Fifth Circuit recognized, 
“Dastar makes clear that such claims are not actionable under § 43(a).” Id.  
General Universal Systems reflects Dastar’s central holding: only 
misrepresentations of the origin of physical goods are actionable under § 
43(a)(1)(A). Other sorts of misrepresentations, including but not limited to 
                                                          
2 Notably, GUS contended that the defendants’ MEPAW software copied GUS’s 
software with only minor modifications, and that Lanham Act claims do not require 
the sort of Altai-style abstraction/filtration analysis required in copyright cases. It 
therefore contended that it could establish false designation of origin simply on the 
basis of the alleged similarity of the defendant’s software.  
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misrepresentations of the origin of technology, are not actionable as false 
designation of origin. See Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc., 
796 F.3d 576, 586-87 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Boiled down, then, the district court's liability 
finding on the reverse passing off claim depended upon its conclusion that Pace 
falsely designated the cloned products’ ‘origin’ by failing to represent to its 
customers that the products—although manufactured by Pace—stemmed from ideas 
or intellectual property that were initially brought to the table by Best. But as the 
Supreme Court has pointed out, the Lanham Act protects the ability to control one’s 
brand; it does not protect the ability to control one’s inventions or innovations.”); 
Geovector Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2016 WL 6662996, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 16, 2016) (“GeoVector’s Lanham Act claim is based on Samsung’s alleged 
appropriation of GeoVector’s augmented reality ideas to create and sell its own 
augmented reality technology. But the Lanham Act does not prohibit conduct of this 
kind; it applies only to the appropriation of tangible goods, not intellectual 
property.”).3  
                                                          
3A broader range of misrepresentations (regarding the “the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or 
commercial activities”) are actionable as false advertising under § 43(a)(1)(B). 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). To sustain a false advertising cause of action, the plaintiff 
must still establish that claims about the origin of technology do in fact pertain to 
the “nature, characteristics, [or] qualities” of the actual goods. Cf. Baden Sports, Inc. 
v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (barring Baden’s Lanham Act 
false advertising claims, which alleged that Molten had falsely claimed to be the 
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ZeniMax’s false designation of origin claim clearly fails under this standard. 
Oculus is unambiguously the origin of the Rift devices; there was therefore nothing 
remotely false about Oculus designating itself as the origin of those devices. Given 
Dastar, the basis on which ZeniMax defends the false designation of origin 
verdict—Defendants’ purportedly false claims about inventorship or the origin of 
technology—is insufficient as a matter of law.  
B. ZeniMax’s Claims Based on Use of Trademarks Within the Slide Deck 
Fail 
ZeniMax refers in passing to Defendants’ use of ZeniMax’s trademarks within 
the slide deck Defendants presented to potential investors, implying that it was those 
                                                          
origin of “innovative” technology in its basketballs); see also OptoLum, Inc. v. Cree, 
Inc., 122 U.S.P.Q.2d 1208 (D. Ariz. 2017) (“A contrary holding—that is, a finding 
that false claims to inventorship are actionable under § 43(a)—impermissibly ‘could 
create overlap between the Lanham and Patent Acts.’”) (citation omitted); Smartix 
Int'l Corp. v. MasterCard Int’l LLC, No. 06 CV 5174 (GBD), 2008 WL 4444554, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008) (collecting cases) (failure to acknowledge “originating 
source of the technology underlying defendants’ affinity card programs[] is not a 
misrepresentation as to the inherent ‘nature, characteristics [or] quality’ of the 
programs themselves.”). A plaintiff asserting false advertising causes of action must, 
moreover, establish elements that do not apply false designation of origin claims. 
Most notably, such plaintiffs must “prove materiality by establishing ‘that the 
defendant's deception is likely to influence the purchasing decision.’” Forest Grp., 
Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. CIV.A. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 
July 29, 2008) (quoting North Amer. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 
1211, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted)), vacated in 
part on other grounds, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
                                                                                         
 Case 3:14-cv-01849-K   Document 1045-1   Filed 06/08/17    Page 11 of 17   PageID 53229
7 
 
uses that falsely designated the origin of the Oculus Rift and/or constituted false 
endorsement. Injunction Brief at 10-11, ¶¶ 19-26; Opposition to Motion for 
Judgment as a Matter of Law at 5-6. 
To the extent ZeniMax’s false designation of origin claim is based on 
Defendants’ use of ZeniMax’s video game trademarks in their presentations to 
potential investors, that claim is indistinguishable from the trademark infringement 
claim on which the jury awarded zero damages despite being charged that ZeniMax 
had recognized trademarks in those marks. Court’s Charge to the Jury, p. 62. The 
Court’s jury instructions distinguished false designation of origin and trademark 
infringement precisely on the basis that a party can recover for false designation of 
origin even though the person is not the owner of a trademark. Compare Court’s 
Charge to the Jury, p. 61 (requiring proof of ownership of legally protectable 
trademarks for trademark infringement claim) and p. 65 (allowing false designation 
of origin claim even though no ownership of protectable trademarks). ZeniMax 
attempts to recharacterize its trademark infringement claim as false designation of 
origin to avoid the jury’s conclusion that it was not entitled to damages for 
Defendants’ use of ZeniMax’s marks, even though the substantive elements of a 
false designation of origin claim (other than the presence of a registered trademark) 
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are the same as for violation of §32 of the Lanham Act, which provides remedies for 
infringement of registered trademarks.4 
On these facts, the doctrine of nominative fair use also overlaps with the 
teaching of Dastar. The nominative fair use doctrine finds certain uses of trademarks 
nonactionable because their use is truthful and nonconfusing as a matter of law.  See 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010). To the 
extent ZeniMax’s claims are based on Defendants’ use of ZeniMax’s marks within 
the slide deck, such use was purely nominative; Defendants used the marks to 
identify ZeniMax’s products and to indicate that those games were compatible with 
                                                          
4 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (“whether we call 
a violation infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin, the test 
is identical—is there a likelihood of confusion?”) (Stevens, J., concurring); Audi AG 
v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) (courts “use the same test to decide 
whether there has been trademark infringement, unfair competition, or false 
designation of origin: the likelihood of confusion between the two marks.”); 
Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prod. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 216-217 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(analyzing both claims together); New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 
1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Whether we call the violation infringement, unfair 
competition or false designation of origin, the test is identical.”); Applause Prod. 
Grp., L.L.C. v. Showtime Events Inc., 2017 WL 1906588 (D. Md. May 4, 2017)(“The 
Lanham Act specifies that the test of liability for a false designation of origin claim 
is the same ‘likelihood of confusion analysis’ arising in a traditional trademark 
infringement claim.”) (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:18 (4th ed. 2003, March 2017 update); Philip Morris 
USA, Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667, 674 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“The elements of 
trademark infringement and false designation of origin [under the Lanham Act] are 
identical, and the same evidence will establish both claims.”). 
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the Oculus Rift, not to claim that ZeniMax stood behind Defendants’ product. 
Importantly, the error with respect to the Dastar-barred false designation of origin 
claim contaminated the jury’s verdict even though the Court instructed the jury on 
nominative fair use. As the Court’s instruction noted, nominative fair use requires 
that the defendant (1) make a use to refer to the plaintiff, (2) use “only so much of 
the trademarks as was reasonably necessary,” and (3) do nothing else to suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement of the defendant’s product by the plaintiff.  Court’s 
Charge to the Jury, p. 67. Both factors (2) and (3) are profoundly affected by the 
conflation of origin of goods or services with the origin of ideas or technology. 
C. ZeniMax Cannot Avoid Dastar by Characterizing its Claims in False 
Endorsement Terms 
 
Perhaps recognizing the legal inadequacy of its false designation of origin 
claim, ZeniMax suggests in its most recent Opposition brief that Defendants’ 
conduct amounted to false designation of origin and/or trademark infringement 
because it falsely suggested that ZeniMax was endorsing Oculus’s product. See 
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) at 2, 5-6. False endorsement is, of course, a 
distinct Lanham Act theory, and one on which the jury was not charged. See Court’s 
Charge to the Jury at 53-56 (charging on unfair competition claims), 61-71 (charging 
on trademark infringement and false designation claims). But regardless, to the 
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extent ZeniMax’s claims depend on the allegation that Defendants’ conduct 
suggested that Defendants, rather than ZeniMax, had created virtual reality 
technology or the VR demo, those claims are barred by Dastar however they are 
denominated. See Appjigger GmbH v. BLU Prods., Inc., 2016 WL 4119720 at *4 
(S.D. Fla. March 7, 2016) (“A defendant does not violate the Lanham Act's false 
advertising provisions by promoting its product while failing to properly attribute 
the source of the underlying technology embodied in the product.”). ZeniMax cannot 
escape that result by characterizing the conduct as falsely suggesting and 
endorsement rather than falsely designating the origin of the technology. See 
Rudovsky v. West Publ. Corp., 2010 WL 2804844 at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2010) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s false advertising and false endorsement claims based on false 
designation of authorship); Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v. Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 
467 F.Supp.2d 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that 
misrepresentations of authorship falsely suggested the affiliation or sponsorship of 
the true author, and noting that the “holding necessarily applies with equal force to 
any claim for “false ... representation[s]” with respect to the “affiliation ... of [one] 
person with another person,” where, as here, one person is the publisher of a novel 
and the other is the author of the novel, because the holding of Dastar would be 
meaningless if a false authorship claim could be recast in this manner”). 
 
                                                                                         




For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter judgment as a matter of law in 
favor of Defendants.  
          RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,  
 
       By:  _________________________ 
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